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Abstract:
We review possible measures of complexity which might
in particular be applicable to situations where the complex-
ity seems to arise spontaneously. We point out that not all
of them correspond to the intuitive (or “naive”) notion, and
that one should not expect a unique observable of complexity.
One of the main problems is to distinguish complex from dis-
ordered systems. This and the fact that complexity is closely
related to information requires that we also give a review of
information measures. We finally concentrate on quantities
which measure in some way or other the difficulty of classify-
ing and forecasting sequences of discrete symbols, and study
them in simple examples.
I. INTRODUCTION
The nature which we observe around us is certainly
very “complex”, and the main aim of science has always
been to reduce this complexity by descriptions in terms
of simpler laws. Biologists, social and cognitive scientists
have felt this most, and in these sciences attempts to for-
malize the concept of complexity have a certain tradition.
Physicists, on the other hand, have often been able to
reduce the complexity of the situations they were con-
fronted with, and maybe for that reason the study of
complex behavior has not been pursued very much by
physicists until very recently.
This reduction of complexity in physical systems is on
the one hand achieved by studying archetypical situa-
tions (“Gedanken experiments”). On the other hand,
very often when a complete description of a system is in-
feasible (like in statistical mechanics) , one can go over to
a statistical description which might then be drastically
more simple.
Thus, in the most complex situations studied tradition-
ally in statistical mechanics, the large number of degrees
of freedom can usually be reduced to few “order parame-
ters”. This is called the “slaving principle” by H. Haken
[1]. Mathematically, it is related to central limit the-
orems of statistics and to center manifold theorems [2]
1 This paper appeared first in Proceedings of the 5th Mexican
School on Statistical Physics (EMFE 5), Oaxtepec, Me´xico,
1989, ed. F. Ramos-Go´mez (World Scientific, Singapore 1991);
the present version has some errors corrected and some footnotes
added to account for recent developments.
FIG. 1. Julia set of the map z′ = z2 − 0.86− 0.25i.
of dynamical system theory. Central limit theorems say
that for large systems with many independent degrees of
freedom statistical descriptions in terms of global vari-
ables become independent of details. Center manifold
theorems say that in cases with very different time scales
(e.g., near a bifurcation point) the fast modes can be
effectively eliminated, and it is the slow modes which
dominate the main behavior.
But there are extremely simple systems (like the cel-
lular automaton called “game of life” [3]) which can be
programmed as universal computers. One can of course
try a purely statistical description also in this case. But
it can be very inappropriate. One can never be sure that
some of the details not captured by such a description do
not later turn out to have been essential.
And there are dynamical systems like those describable
by a quadratic map
xn+1 = a− x2n, xn ∈ [−a, a] , a ∈ [0, 2] (1)
where even the reduction to a single order parameter does
not imply a simple behavior. The complexity of the lat-
ter can be seen in a number of ways. First of all, the
behavior can depend very strongly on the parameter a:
there is a set of positive measure on which the attractor
is chaotic [4], but this is believed to be nowhere dense,
while windows with periodic attractors are dense. Sec-
ondly, at the transitions from periodicity to aperiodicity
there are (an infinite number of) “Feigenbaum points”
[5], each of which resembles a critical phenomenon. The
richness inherent in Eq.(1) becomes even more obvious if
we let xn and the parameter a be complex. The result-
ing Julia and Mandelbrot sets [6] (see e.g. Fig. 1) have
become famous for their intricate structure even among
the general public.
Finally (and most importantly for us), the trajecto-
ries of Eq.(1) themselves can be very complex. To be
more specific, let us first discretize trajectories by defin-
ing [7] variables sn ∈ {L,R,C} with sn = L if xn < 0,
sn = R if xn > 0, and sn = C if xn = 0. Similar
“symbolic dynamics” can be defined also for other dy-
namical systems, with the mapping from the trajectories
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2(xn;n ∈ Z) into the “itineraries” (sn) being one-to-one
for all starting points x0. In general, one is indeed sat-
isfied if this mapping is 1-to-1 for nearly all sequences.
In this case, one can drop the symbol “C”, and encode
the trajectories of the quadratic map (of a large class of
one-humped maps indeed) by binary (R,L)-sequences.
The complexity of the map is reflected then in the fact
that the itineraries obtained in this way show very spe-
cific structure, both “grammatically” (i.e., disregarding
probabilities) and probabilistically.
Systems of similar complexity are e.g. the output of
nonlinear electronic circuits, reversals of the earth’s mag-
netic field, and patterns created by chemical reactions or
by hydrodynamic turbulence. Beautiful examples of the
latter are pictures of Jupiter, with numerous turbulent
eddies surrounding the giant red spot.
One characteristic common to all these instances is
that the complexity is self-generated in the narrow sense
that the formulation of the problem is translationally in-
variant, and the observed structure arises from a sponta-
neous breakdown of translational invariance (in the case
of Jupiter, it is azimuthal rotation invariance which is
broken). But the most interesting case of self-generated
complexity in a wider sense is presumably life itself.
If we want to understand better the generation of com-
plex behavior, we have at first a semantic problem: there
does not seem to exist a universally accepted and for-
malized notion of what is “complexity”, though most of
us certainly would agree intuitively that such a notion
should exist. As physicists used to work with precise
concepts it should thus be one of our first aims to find
such a precise notion. In the ideal case, it should be fully
quantitative, i.e. there should be an observable and a
prescription for measuring it.
Actually, the situation is even worse: the most widely
known concept of complexity of symbol sequences, the
“algorithmic complexity” [8,9], is actually a measure of
information (following Ref.[l0], we shall thus call it be-
low “algorithmic information”). In the situations we are
interested in, it is indeed closer to randomness than to
complexity, although the similarities and differences are
rather subtle. That information, randomness and com-
plexity are closely related concepts should not be a sur-
prise. But most of us feel very strongly that – even if
we cannot pin down this difference – there is a crucial
and all-important difference between complex and merely
random situations.
For this reason, we shall in the next situation review in-
formation measures. In particular, we shall confront the
Shannon information (which is a statistical measure and
is indeed very closely related to thermodynamic entropy)
[11] with purely algorithmic (i.e., nonprobabilistic) mea-
sures, the most prominent of which is algorithmic infor-
mation itself. While the Shannon information can only
deal with ensembles, and cannot strictly spoken attribute
an information content to an individual message, the lat-
ter are designed to apply to single messages. Apart from
very practical applications to data compression problems,
the main application of algorithmic information is to se-
quences like the digit string of pi = 3.14159 . . ., a (hope-
fully existing) proof of Fermat’s last theorem, or the DNA
sequence of Albert Einstein. These obviously are unique
objects and should not be considered as just randomly
chosen elements of some ensembles. Indeed, in these last
examples the question of randomness does not arise, and
thus information content and randomness cannot be the
same. This is not true of the applications we are inter-
ested in. There, we just want an observable which can
help us in making this distinction.
In sec.3, we shall come back to our central goal of find-
ing a measure of complexity for these cases. In a search
for such an observable, we shall make a list of required
properties, and equipped with this we shall scan through
the literature. We’ll find several concepts which have
been proposed, and all of which have advantages and
drawbacks. We shall argue that indeed no unique mea-
sure of complexity should exist, but that different defini-
tions can be very helpful in their appropriate places.
Finally, in the last section, we shall apply these con-
cepts to measure the complexity of some symbol se-
quences like those generated by the quadratic map or
by simple cellular automata.
II. INFORMATION MEASURES
A. Shannon Information [11]
We consider a discrete random variable X with out-
comes xi, i = 1, . . . N . The probabilities Prob(X = xi)
are denoted as Pi. They satisfy the constraints 0 ≤ Pi ≤
1 and
∑
i Pi = 1. The entropy or uncertainty function of
X is defined as
H(X) = −
N∑
i=1
Pi logPi (2)
(here and in the following, all logarithms are taken to
base 2). It has the following properties which are easily
checked:
(i) H(X) ≥ 0, and H(X) = 0 only if all Pi = 0 except
for one single outcome x1.
(ii) For fixed N , the maximum of H(X) is attained if
all Pi are equal. In this case, H(X) = logN .
These two properties show that H is indeed a measure
of uncertainty. More precisely, one can show that (the
smallest integer ≥) H(X) is just the average number of
yes/no answers one needs to know in order to specify the
precise value of i, provided one uses an optimal strat-
egy. Thus, H(X) can also be interpreted as an average
information: it is the average information received by an
observer, who observes the actual outcome of a realiza-
tion of X. Notice that Eq.(2) is indeed of the form of an
average value, namely that of the function log 1/Pi.
Equation (2) would not be unique if properties (i) and
(ii) were all we would require from an information mea-
3sure. Alternative ansaetze would be e.g. the Reny´ı en-
tropies
H(q)(X) = (1− q)−1 log
(
N∑
i=1
P qi
)
. (3)
What singles out the ansatz (2) is that with it, infor-
mation can be given piecewise without loss, i.e. in some
sense it becomes an additive quantity. What we mean by
this is the following: Assume that our random variable
X is actually a pair of variables,
X = (Y,Z) , (4)
with the outcome of an experiment labeled by two indices
i and k,
xik = (yi, zk) . (5)
We denote by pk the probability Prob(Z = zk) , and
by p
(X)
i|k the conditional probability Prob(Y = yi|Z =
zk). Similarly, we denote by H(Z) the entropy of Z,
and by H(Y |zk) the entropy of Y conditioned on Z =
zk, H(Y |zk) = −
∑
i p
(X)
i|k log p
(X)
i|k . From Eq. (2) we get
then
H(X)≡ H(Y,Z) = H(Z) +
∑
k
pkH(Y |zk)
≡ H(Z) +H(Y |Z) . (6)
The interpretation of this is obvious: in order to spec-
ify the outcome of X, we can first give the information
needed to pin down the outcome of Z, and then we have
to give the average information for Y , which might – if Y
and Z are correlated – depend on Z. It is easy to check
that Eq. (6) would not hold for the Reny´ı entropies, un-
less Y and Z were uncorrelated, Pik = p
(X)
i pk.
Let us now study the difference
R(Y,Z) = H(Y ) +H(Z)−H(Y,Z) . (7)
It is obvious that R(Y,Z) = 0 if Y and Z are uncorre-
lated. The fact that in all other cases R(Y, Z) > 0 is not
so easily seen formally, but is evident from the interpre-
tation of H as an uncertainty: If there are correlations
between Y and Z, then knowledge of the outcome of Z
can only reduce the uncertainty about Y , and can never
enhance it. For this reason, is called a redundancy or
a mutual information. It is the average redundancy in
the transmitted information, if the outcomes of Y and of
Z are specified without making use of the correlations.
Also, it is the average information which we learn on Y
by measuring Z, and vice versa.
We shall mainly be interested in applying these con-
cepts to symbol sequences. We assume that the sequences
. . . sisi+1si+2 . . . with the si chosen from some finite “al-
phabet” are distributed according to some translation
invariant distribution. This means that, for any n and k,
P (s1s2 . . . sn) = P (s1+ks2+k . . . sn+k) , (8)
where P (s1s2 . . . sn) is the probability that Sk = sk for
1 ≤ k ≤ n, irrespective of the symbols outside the win-
dow [1...n]. These “block probabilities” satisfy the Kol-
mogorov consistency conditions
P (s2 . . . sn) =
∑
s1
P (s1s2 . . . sn) ,
P (s1 . . . sn−1)=
∑
sn
P (s1s2 . . . sn). (9)
If there exists some N such that
P (sN+1|s0s1 . . . sN ) = P (sN+1|s1 . . . sN ) , (10)
we say that the distribution follows an N -th order
Markov process.
Extending the definitions of entropy to the n-tuple ran-
dom variable S = (S1 . . . Sn), we get the block entropy
Hn = −
∑
s1...sn
P (s1s2 . . . sn) logP (s1s2 . . . sn) . (11)
Assume now a sequence is to be described symbol af-
ter symbol in a sequential way. If this description is to
be without redundancy, then the average length of the
description (or encoding) per symbol is given by
h = lim
n→∞hn , (12)
hn = Hn+1 −Hn . (13)
The interpretation of hn is as the information needed to
specify the (n+1)-st symbol, provided all n previous ones
are known. The limit in Eq. (12) means that we might
have to make use of arbitrarily long correlations if we
want to make the most compact encoding.
In the case of an N -th order Markov process, the limit
in Eq. (12) is reached at n = N , i.e. hn = h for all n ≥ N .
Otherwise, the limit in Eq. (12) is reached asymptotically
from above, since the hn are nonincreasing,
hn+1 ≤ hn . (14)
This is clear from the interpretation of hn as average con-
ditional information: Knowing more symbols in the past
can only reduce the uncertainty about the next symbol,
but not increase it.
Following Shannon [11], h is called the entropy of the
source emitting the sequence, or simply the entropy of the
sequence. If the sequence is itself an encoding of a smooth
dynamical process (as the L,R symbol sequences of the
quadratic map mentioned in the introduction), then h is
called the Kolmogorov-Sinai or metric entropy of the dy-
namical process. Before leaving this subsection, I should
make three remarks:
(a) The name “entropy” is justified by the fact that
thermodynamic entropy is just the Shannon uncertainty
(up to a constant factor equal to Boltzmann’s con-
stant kB) of the (micro-)state distribution, provided the
macrostate is given.
4(b) Assume that we have a random variable X with
distribution Prob(X = xi) = Pi. But from some pre-
vious observation (or from a priori considerations) we
have come to the erroneous conclusion that the distribu-
tion is P ′i , and we thus use the P
′
i for encoding further
realizations of X. The average code length needed to
describe each realization is then
∑
i Pi log 1/P
′
i , while it
would have been
∑
i Pi log 1/Pi, had we used the optimal
encoding. The difference
K =
∑
i
Pi log
Pi
P ′i
(15)
is called the Kullback-Leibler (or relative) entropy. It is
obviously non-negative, and zero only if P = P ′ – a result
which can also be derived formally.
(c) In empirical entropy estimates, one has to estimate
the probabilities Pi from the frequencies of occurrence,
Pi ≈Mi/M . For small values of Mi, this gives systematic
errors due to the nonlinearity of the logarithm in Eq. (2).
These errors can be eliminated to leading orders in Mi
by replacing Eq. (2) by [12] 2
H(X) ≈
N∑
i=1
Mi
M
[
logM − ψ(Mi)− (−1)
Mi
(Mi + 1)Mi
]
(16)
where ψ(x) = d log Γ(x)/dx. Alternative methods for
estimating entropies of symbol sequences are discussed
in Refs. [13,14].
B. Information measures for individual sequences
1. Algorithmic Information (“Algorithmic Complexity”)
The Shannon entropy measures the average informa-
tion needed to encode a sequence (i.e., a message), but
it does not take into account the information needed to
specify the encoding procedure itself which depends on
the probability distribution. This is justified, e.g., if one
sends repeatedly messages with the same distribution, so
that the work involved in setting up the frame can be
neglected. But the Shannon information tends to under-
estimate the amount of information needed to encode any
individual single sequence. On the other hand, in a truly
random sample there will always be sequences which by
chance have a very simple structure, and these sequences
might be much easier to encode. Finally, not for all se-
quences it makes sense to consider them as members of
stationary ensembles. We have already mentioned the
digits of pi and the DNA sequence of some specific indi-
vidual.
2 Note added in reprinting: Ref. [12] is now obsolete and should
be replaced by P. Grassberger, arXiv:physics/0307138 (2003).
To define the information content of individual se-
quences, we use the fact that any universal computer
U can simulate any other with a finite emulation pro-
gram. Thus, if a finite sequence S = s1s2 . . . sN can be
computed and printed with a program ProgU (S) on com-
puter U , it can be computed on any other computer V
by a program ProgV (S) of length
LV (S) ≡ Len[ProgV (S)] ≤ Len[ProgU (S)] + cV , (17)
where cV is the length of the emulation program. It is a
constant independent of S. The algorithmic information
of S relative to U is defined as the length of the shortest
program which yields S on U ,
CU (S) = min
ProgU (S)
Len[ProgU (S)]. (18)
If S is infinite, then we can define the algorithmic infor-
mation per symbol as
c(S) = lim supN →∞ 1
N
CU (SN ) . (19)
Notice that c(S) is independent of the computer U due
to Eq. (17), in contrast to the algorithmic information of
a finite object.
There are some details which we have to mention in
connection with Eq. (18). First of all, we have to specify
the computer U first. Otherwise, if we would allow to
take the minimum in Eq. (18) over all possible computers,
the definition would trivially give C(S) = 1 for all S. The
reason is that we can always build a computer which on
the input “0” gives S, and for which all other programs
start “1... ” .
Secondly, we demand that the computer stops after
having produced S. The reason is essentially twofold:
On the one hand, we can then define mutual informa-
tions very much as in the Shannon case as Rc(S, T ) =
C(S) + C(T )− C(ST ), where ST is just the concatena-
tion of S and T . For two uncorrelated sequences S and
T , this gives exactly zero only if the computer stops after
having produced S. The other reason is that with this
convention, we can attribute an algorithmic probability
to S by
PU (S) =
∑
ProgU (S)
2−Len[ProgU (S)] . (20)
In this way, we can define a posteriori a probability mea-
sure also in cases where no plausible a priori measure
exists.
How is the algorithmic information C(S) related to
the Shannon information h? In principle, we could use
the algorithmic probability Eq. (20) in the definition of
h, but we assume instead that S is drawn from some
other stationary probability distribution, so that h can
be defined via Eqs. (11) – (13). Then one can show [10]
that C(S) ≤ h for all sequences, with the equality holding
for nearly all of them.
5One interesting case where algorithmic and statisti-
cal information measures seem to disagree is the digits
3141592... of pi. Since there exist very efficient programs
for computing pi (of length ∼ logN for N digits), the al-
gorithmic information of this sequence is zero. But these
digits look completely random by any statistical criterion
[15]: Not only do all digits appear equally often, but also
all digit pairs, all triples, etc. Does this mean that pi is
random?
The question might sound rather silly. Even if the se-
quence might look random, pi is of course not just a ran-
dom number but carries a very special meaning. Tech-
nically, an important difference between C(S) and any
statistical estimate of the entropy h(S) is that C(S) mea-
sures the information needed to specify the first N dig-
its, while h measures the much larger average information
needed to specify any N consecutive digits. For the digits
of pi, these two are very different: It is much easier to get
the first 100 digits, say, than the digits from 1001 to 1100.
For symbol sequences generated by self-organizing sys-
tems, this latter difference is absent. There, the first dig-
its neither have more meaning nor are in any other way
singled out from the other digits, whence 〈C(S)〉 = h.
The same is true for nearly all sequences drawn from any
ensemble, whence C(S) = h nearly always.
Thus, for the instances we are interested in, algorith-
mic information is just a measure of randomness, and not
a measure of complexity in our sense.
2. Ziv-Lempel Information [16]
Given an infinite sequence with unknown origin, we
never can estimate reliably its algorithmic information,
since we never know whether we indeed have found its
shortest description. Said more technically, C(S) is not
effectively computable. A way out of this problem is to
give up the requirement that the description is absolutely
the shortest one. Instead, we can arbitrarily restrict the
method of encoding, provided that this restriction is not
so drastic that we get trivial results in most cases. In
the literature, there exist several suggestions of how to
restrict the encodings of a sequence in order to obtain ef-
fectively computable algorithmic information measures.
The best known and most elegant is due to Ziv and Lem-
pel [16].
There, the sequence is broken into words W1,W2, . . .
such that W0 = ∅, and Wk+1 is the shortest new
word immediately following Wk. For instance, the
sequence S = 11010100111101001 . . . is broken into
(1)(10)(101)(0)(01)(11)(1010)(01 . . .. In this way, each
word Wk with k > 0 is an extension of some Wj with
j < k by one single digit slast. It is encoded simply by
the pair (j, slast). It is clear that this is a good encoding
in the sense that S can be uniquely decoded from the
code sequence. Both the encoder and the decoder built
up the same dictionary of words, and thus the decoder
can always find and add the new word.
Why is it an efficient code? The reason is that for se-
quences of low apparent entropy there are strong repeti-
tions, such that the average length of the code words Wk
increases faster, and the number of needed pairs (j, slast)
increases less than for high-entropy sequences. More pre-
cisely, the average word length increases roughly like [14]
〈Len[Wk]〉 ≈ logN
h
(21)
with the length N of the sequence, and the information
needed to encode a pair (j, slast) increases like logN . The
total length of the code sequence is thus expected to be
MN ≈ (1 + logN)(Nh/ logN) = hN(1 +O(1/ logN)).
More precisely, the Ziv-Lempel information (or Ziv-
Lempel “complexity” 3) of S is defined via the length
MN of the resulting encoding of SN as
cZL(S) = lim
N→∞
MN/N. (22)
It is shown in ref.(16] that CZL = h for nearly all se-
quences, provided h is defined. Thus, the Ziv-Lempel
information agrees again with the Shannon entropy in
the cases we are interested in. Indeed, CZL = h holds
also for sequences like the digits of pi since, like h, the
Ziv-Lempel coding is only sensitive to the statistics of
(increasingly long) blocks of length  N .
In practice, Ziv-Lempel coding is a very efficient
method of data compression [17], and methods related
to it (based on Eq. (22)) are among the most efficient
ones for estimating entropy [14,18] 4.
Just like Eq. (12) for the Shannon entropy, and like the
minimal description length entering the definition of the
algorithmic information , Eq. (22) converges from above.
Figure 2 shows qualitatively the behavior of the block en-
tropies Hn versus the block length n, and the Ziv-Lempel
code length versus the string length N . Both curves have
the same qualitative appearance, though the interpreta-
tion is slightly different. In the Shannon case, it is the
correlations between symbols which are more and more
taken into account, so that the information per symbol
– the slope of the graph – decreases with n. In the Ziv-
Lempel case, on the other hand, in addition to the spe-
cific sequence also the information about the probability
distribution has to be encoded. This contributes mostly
at the beginning, whence the information per symbol is
highest at the beginning. Otherwise stated, Ziv-Lempel
coding is self-learning, and its efficiency increases with
the length of the training material.
As we have already mentioned, the Ziv-Lempel encod-
ing is just one example of a wide class of codes which do
3 In [16], Ziv & Lempel introduced another quantity which they
called the “complexity” of their algorithm, but which they later
never used, obviously to avoid further confusion between that
complexity and the Ziv-Lempel information.
4 This remark is now obsolete. For an overview
over recent activities in text compression, see
http://mattmahoney.net/dc/text.html.
6FIG. 2. Ziv-Lempel code length for a typical sequence with
finite entropy versus the sequence length N , resp. Shannon
block entropies versus block length n (schematically).
not need any a priori knowledge of the statistics to be effi-
cient. A similar method which is more efficient for finite
sequences but which is much harder to implement was
given by Lempel and Ziv [19]. For a recent treatment,
see ref. [20].
The increase of the average code length of Ziv-Lempel
and similar codes with N has been studied for probabilis-
tic models in ref.[20]. In particular, it was shown there
that for simple models such as moving average or autore-
gressive models which depend on k real parameters one
has
〈MN 〉 ≈ hN + k
2
logN . (23)
This is easily understood: For an optimal coding, we have
somehow also to encode the k parameters, but for finiteN
we will only need them with finite precision. If the central
limit theorem holds, their tolerated error will decrease
as N−1/2, whence we need 12 logN bits per parameter.
In this context, we might mention that in the case of
algorithmic information, including the information about
the sequence length (i.e., the information when to stop
the construction) gives a contribution ∼ logN to C(SN )
also for trivial sequences. This is not yet included in
Eq. (23).
III. MEASURES OF COMPLEXITY
A. General
Phenomena which in the physics literature are con-
sidered as complex are, among others, chaotic dynami-
cal systems, fractals, spin glasses, neural networks, qua-
sicrystals, and cellular automata (CA). Common features
of these and other examples are the following:
(1) They are somehow situated between disorder and
(simple) order [22], i.e. they involve some hard to de-
scribe and not just random structures. As an example,
consider fig.3. There, virtually nobody would call the left
panel complex. Some people hesitate between the middle
and right panels when being asked to point out the most
complex one. But once told that the right one is created
FIG. 3. Three patterns used to demonstrate that the pattern
that one would intuitively call the most complex is neither the
one with the lowest entropy (left) nor the one with the highest
(right). That is, complexity is not equivalent to randomness,
but rather is between order and chaos.
by means of a random number generator, the right panel
is usually no longer considered as complex – at least until
it is realized that a “random” number generator does not
produce random numbers at all.
(2) They often involve hierarchies (e.g. fractals and
spin glasses). Indeed, hierarchies have often been consid-
ered as a main source of complexity (see, e.g., [22]).
(3) But as the example of human societies shows most
clearly, a strict hierarchy can be ridiculously simple when
compared to what is called a “tangled hierarchy” in
ref. [23]. This is a hierarchy violated by feedback from
lower levels, creating in this way “strange loops”. Feed-
back as a source of complexity is also obvious in dynami-
cal systems. On the logical (instead of physical) level, in
the form of self reference, feedback is the basis of Goedel’s
theorem which seems closely tied to complex behavior
[23,10].
(4) In a particular combination of structure and hi-
erarchy, an efficient and meaningful description of com-
plex systems usually requires concepts of different levels.
The essence of self-generated complexity seems to be that
higher-level concepts arise without being put in explic-
itly.
As a simple example, consider figs.4 to 6. These fig-
ures show patterns created by the 1-dimensional CA with
rule nr. 110 in Wolfram’s [24] notation, in decreasing res-
olution. In this CA, a row of “spins” with s ∈ {0, 1} is
simultaneously updated by the rule that neighborhoods
111, 100, and 000 give a “0”, while the other 5 neigh-
borhoods give “1”. Figure 4 shows that this CA has a
periodic invariant state with spatial period 14, i.e. a 14-
fold degenerate “ground state”. In a first shift from a
low-level to higher-level description, we might call these
“vacua”, although the original vacuum is of course the
state with zeroes only. Figure 5 shows that between dif-
ferent vacua there are kinks which on a coarser scale prop-
agate like particles. In Fig. 6, finally, only the “particles”
are shown, and we see a rather complicated evolution of
a gas of these particles in which the original concept (the
spins) are completely hidden. Notice that nothing in the
original formulation of the rule had hinted at the higher
level concepts (vacua and particles).
(5) Complex systems are usually composed of many
7parts, but this alone does not yet qualify them as com-
plex: An ideal gas is not more complex than a human
brain because it has more molecules than the brain has
nerve cells. What is important is that there are strong
and non-trivial correlations between these parts. Techni-
cally, this is best expressed via mutual informations, ei-
ther probabilistically [26] or algorithmically [21]: A sys-
tem is complex if mutual informations are strong and
slowly decaying.
FIG. 4. Pattern created with CA nr. 110 from a random
start. The periodic pattern with spatial periodicity 14 and
time periodicity 7 seems to be attractive, but between two
phase-shifted such patterns there must be stable kinks. Time
increases downward.
Examples are of course fractals and critical phenom-
ena, but the correlations there seem still very simple com-
pared to those in some cellular automata.
First, there are computationally universal automata
like the “game of life”. For them, we can construct initial
configurations which do whatever function we want them
to do. But these configurations are in general rather
tricky, with strong constraints over very long distances.
In Fig. 7, we show a configuration which is called a “glider
gun” [27]. Periodically, it sends out a “glider” which then
moves – oscillating with period 4 – diagonally away from
the gun. In this configuration, all black cells in the upper
FIG. 5. Collisions between two kinks for CA 110 [25]. No-
tice that the kinks behave like “particles”. There are such
“particles” with at least 6 different velocities.
FIG. 6. Evolution of CA 110 on a coarse-grained scale. Every
pixel represents a block of 14 spins. The pixel is white if
the block is the same as the neighboring block to the left,
otherwise it is black. In this way, only kinks are seen. In
order to compress vertically, only every 21-th time step is
shown.
FIG. 7. A “glider gun” in the game of life. The game of life
is defined so that in each generation, a cell becomes black
(“alive”) if it had in its nine-cell neighborhood 3 or 4 alive
cells in the previous generation. Else it dies. Gliders are the
configurations made up of 5 alive cells in the lower right corner
(from ref.[27]).
part are needed in order to function, i.e. there are very
strong initial correlations if the state is to do what we
want it to do.
While Fig. 7 illustrates the correlations in configura-
tions specially designed to do something meaningful, in
another cellular automaton strong correlations seem to
appear spontaneously. This is the simple 1-dimensional
CA with rule 22 [28]. In this model, which will be treated
in more detail in the last section, any random initial con-
figuration leads to a statistically stationary state with
extremely long and hard to describe correlations. The
non-triviality of these correlations is best expressed by
the fact that they neither seem to be self-similar or frac-
tal, nor quasi-periodic, nor ordered (block entropies Hn
tend to infinity for increasing block lengths), nor random
8(entropy estimates hn = Hn+1−Hn seem to tend towards
zero).
The correlations between the parts of a complex ob-
ject imply that the whole object in a way is “more than
its parts”. Let me be more specific. Of course, we can
describe the whole object completely by describing its
parts, and thus it cannot be more than these. But such a
description will be redundant, and it misses the fact that
the correlations probably indicate that the object as a
whole might have some meaning.
(6) More important than correlations among the parts
of a complex system are often correlations between the
object and its environment [29,30].
Indeed, a piece of DNA is complex not so much because
of the correlations within its base pairs, but because it
matches with a whole machinery made for reading them,
and this machinery matches – i.e., is correlated with –
the rest of the organism, which again matches with the
environment in which the organism is to live in. Simi-
larly, the letters of a novel in some language could hardly
be considered as complex if there were no possibility in
principle to read it. The ability to read a novel, and
to perceive it thus as complex, requires some correlation
between the novel and the reader.
This remark opens several new questions. First, it
shows that we have to be careful when talking about
the complexity “of an object”. Here, we obviously would
rather mean the complexity increase of the combined sys-
tem {object + environment} when adding the object.
Secondly, when saying that correlations with structures
within ourselves might be crucial for us to “perceive” an
object as complex, I did not mean this subjectivity as
derogatory. Indeed, I claim (and shall comment more on
this later) that it is impossible to define a purely objec-
tive notion of complexity. Thus, complexity only exists if
it has a chance to be perceived. Finally, the above shows
that complexity is related to meaning [31].
(7) Pursuing seriously the problem that complexity is
somehow related to the concept of meaning would lead us
too far from physics into deep questions of philosophy, so
I will not do it. But let me just point out that a situation
acquires some meaning to us if we realize that only some
of its features are essential, that these features are related
to something we have already stored in our memory, or
that its parts fit together in some unique way. Thus we
realize that we can replace a full, detailed and straightfor-
ward description by a compressed and more “intelligent”
description which captures only these essential aspects,
eventually employing already existing information. We
mention this since the relation between compression of
information and complexity will be a recurrent theme in
the following. Understanding the meaning is just the act
of replacement of a detailed description containing all
irrelevant and redundant information by a compressed
description of the relevant aspects only.
(8) From the above we conclude that complexity in
some very broad sense always is a difficulty of a mean-
ingful task. More precisely, the complexity of a pattern,
a machine, an algorithm, etc., is the difficulty of the most
important task related to it.
By “meaningful” we exclude on the one hand purely
mechanical tasks, as for instance the lifting of a heavy
stone. We do not want to relate this to any complex-
ity. But we also want to exclude the difficulty of coding,
storing, and reproducing a pattern like the right panel of
fig.3, as the details of that pattern have no meaning to
us.
A technical problem is that, when we speak about a
difficulty, we have to say what are our allowed tools and
what are our most important limitations. Think e.g. of
the complexity of an algorithm. Depending on whether
CPU time is most seriously limited or core memory, we
consider the time or space complexity as the more im-
portant. Also, these complexities depend on whether we
use a single-CPU (von Neumann) or multiple-CPU com-
puter.
(9) Another problem is that we don’t have a good def-
inition of “meaning”, whence we cannot take the above
as a real definition of complexity. This is a problem in
particular when we deal with self-generated complexity.
In situations which are controlled by a strict outside
hierarchy, we can replace “meaningful” by “functional”,
as complex systems are usually able to perform some task
[31]. This is also true in the highest self-organized sys-
tems, namely in real life. There it is obvious, that e.g.
the complexity of an eye is due to the fact that the eye
has to perform the task of seeing.
But in systems with self-generated complexity it is not
always obvious what we really mean by a “task”. In
particular, while we often can see a task played by some
part of a living being (the eye) or even of an ecosystem,
it is impossible to attribute a task to the entire system.
Also, we must be careful to distinguish between the mere
ability to perform a task, and the tendency or probability
to do so.
Let me illustrate this again with cellular automata. As
we said, the “game of life” can be programmed as a uni-
versal computer. This means that it can simulate any
possible behavior, given only the right initial configura-
tion. For instance, we can use it to compute the digits
of pi, but we can also use it to proof Fermat’s last the-
orem (provided it is right). Thus it can do meaningful
tasks if told so from the outside. But this does not mean
that it will do interesting things when given a random
initial condition. Indeed, for most initial conditions the
evolution is rather disappointing: For the first 400 time
steps or so, the complexity of the pattern seems to in-
crease, giving rise (among others) to many gliders, but
then the gliders collide with all the interesting structures
and destroy them, and after about 2000 time steps only
very dull structures survive. This is in contrast to real
life (and, for that part, to CA rule 22!), which certainly
has also started with a random initial configuration, but
which is still becoming more and more complex.
(10) As a consequence of our insistence on meaningful
tasks, the concept of complexity becomes subjective. We
9really cannot speak of the complexity of a pattern with-
out reference to the observer. After all, the right-hand
pattern in fig.3 might have some meaning to somebody,
it is just we who decide that it is meaningless.
This situation is of course not new in physics. It arises
also in the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum me-
chanics, and it appears also in Gibbs’ paradoxon. In
the latter, the entropy of an isotope mixture depends on
whether one wants to distinguish between the isotopes or
not. Yet it might be unpleasant to many, in particular
since the dependence on the observer as regards complex-
ity is much less trivial than in Gibbs’ paradoxon.
Indeed, statistical mechanics suggests an alternative to
considering definite object as we pretended above. It is
related to the observation that when we call the right
panel of fig.3 random, we actually do not pay attention
to the fine details of that pattern. We thus do not really
make a statement about that very pattern, but about the
class of all similar patterns. More precisely, instead say-
ing that the pattern is not complex, we should (or could,
at least) say “that pattern seems to belong to the class of
random patterns, and this class is trivial to characterize:
it has no features” (32). The question of what feature
is “meaningful” is now replaced by the question of what
ensemble to use.
We have thus a dichotomy: We can either pretend to
deal with definite objects, or we can pretend to deal only
with equivalence classes of objects or probability distri-
butions (“ensembles”). In the latter case we avoid the
problems of what is “meaning” by simply defining the
ensembles we want to study. This simplifies things some-
what at the expense of never knowing definitely whether
the objects we are dealing with really belong to the en-
semble, resp. whether they aren’t objects appearing with
zero probability. This dichotomy corresponds exactly to
the two ways of defining information, discussed in the
previous section.
In the following, the dichotomy will be seen more pre-
cisely in several instances. In the tradition of physics, I
will usually prefer the latter (ensemble) attitude. Also
in the tradition of physics and contrary to the main at-
titude of computer science, I will always stress proba-
bilistic aspects in contrast to purely algorithmic ones.
Notice that the correlations mentioned under point (5)
are defined most easily if one deals with probability dis-
tributions. For a conjecture that correlations defined not
probabilistically but purely algorithmically are basic to
a mathematical approach to life, see ref. [21].
In this way, the complexity of an object becomes a dif-
ficulty related to classifying the object, and to describing
the set or rather the ensemble to which it belongs.
These general considerations have hopefully sorted out
somewhat our ideas what a precise definition of complex-
ity should be like. They have made it rather clear that
a unique definition with a universal range of application
does not exist (indeed, one of the most obvious proper-
ties of a complex object is that there is no unique most
important task associated with it). Let us now take the
above as a kind of shopping list, let us go to the liter-
ature, and let us see how the things we find there go
together with it.
B. Space and Time Complexity of Algorithms [33]
We have already mentioned shortly the complexity of
algorithms. The space and time complexities of an al-
gorithm are just the required storage and CPU time,
respectively. A family of problems depending on a dis-
crete parameter N is considered complex (more precisely
“NP-hard”) if the fastest algorithm solving the problem
for every N needs a time which increases exponentially,
although the formulation and verification of a proposed
solution would at most increase polynomially.
Although this is of course a very useful concept in com-
puter science, and moreover fits perfectly into our broad
definition of complexity, it seems of no relevance to our
problem of self-generated complexity. The reason is that
an algorithm is never self-generated but serves a purpose
imposed from outside.
Thus, the computational complexity of an algorithm
performed by a supposedly complex system (e.g., by a
bat when evaluating echo patterns) cannot be used as a
measure for the complexity of the system (of the bat).
However, most of the subsequent complexity measures
are related to complexities of algorithms we are supposed
to perform if we want to deal with the system.
C. Algorithmic and Ziv-Lempel Complexities
It is clear that these information measures are also
complexity measures in the broad sense defined above:
they measure a difficulty of a task, namely the task of
storing and transmitting the full description of an ob-
ject. They differ just in the tools we are allowed to use
when describing (“encoding”) the object.
The problem why we hesitate to accept them as rel-
evant complexity measures is that in the cases we are
interested in, a detailed description of the object is not
meaningful. Take for instance a drop of some liquid.
Its algorithmic complexity would be the length of the
shortest description of the positions of all atoms with in-
finite precision – a truly meaningless task! Indeed, on an
even lower level, we would have to describe also all the
quantum fluctuations, and the task becomes obviously
impossible. But the algorithmic complexity of this drop
is completely different if we agree to work not with in-
dividual drops but with ensembles; the task to describe
the drop in the canonical ensemble, say, is drastically re-
duced. And it is again different if we are content with
the grand canonical ensemble.
The situation is less dramatic but still very similar for
symbol sequences generated by dynamical systems. On
the formal level, this is suggested by the applicability
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of the thermodynamic formalism [34] to dynamical sys-
tems. On the more important intuitive level, this is best
seen from the example of the weather considered as a
dynamical system. There, certainly the task of storing
and transmitting descriptions of climatic time sequences
is much less relevant than e.g. the task of forecasting, i.e.
of finding and using the correlations in these sequences.
In other cases like the digits of pi or the letters of a well-
written computer program, we would accept the algo-
rithmic information is a perfectly reasonable complexity
measure. These sequences are meaningful by themselves,
and when asking about their complexities we probably
do not want to take them just as representatives of some
statistical ensembles.
This illustrates indeed best the subjectivity of any
complexity measure mentioned above. The fact that
complexity is “just” subjective was very often realized,
but usually this is not considered as deep. Instead, it is
considered in general as a sign that “the correct” defi-
nition of complexity is not yet found. I disagree. It is
common to all science that it does not deal with reality
but with idealizations of it. Think just of free fall, which –
though never observed exactly on Earth – is an extremely
useful concept. In the same way, both concepts – of an
object by itself being meaningful, and representing only
an ensemble – are useful idealizations.
Very often, different details of a system are separated
by large length scales. In these cases, it seems obvious
what one wants to include in the description, and the
subjectivity of the complexity is less of a problem. It is
more important in those cases which we consider naively
as most complex: There either the length scale separa-
tions are absent, or they are messed up by feedback or
by amplification mechanisms as in living beings.
D. Logical Depth [35]
A complexity measure more in our spirit is the “logical
depth” introduced by C. Bennett [35]. The logical depth
of a string S is essentially the time needed for a general
purpose computer to actually run the shortest program
generating it. Thus the task is now not that of storing
and retrieving the shortest encoding, but that of actually
performing the decoding. The difference with time com-
plexity (Sec.3b) is that now we do not ask for the time
needed by the fastest program, but rather the shortest.
The reason why this is a good measure, in particular of
self- generated complexity, is Occam’s razor: If we find a
complex pattern of unknown origin, it is reasonable to as-
sume that it was generated from essentially the shortest
possible program. The program must have been assem-
bled by chance, and the chance for a meaningful program
to assemble out of scratch decreases exponentially with
its length.
For a random string S, the time needed to generate it
is essentially the time needed to read in the specification,
and thus it is proportional to its length. In contrast to
FIG. 8. Pattern generated by CA # 86, from an initial con-
figuration having a single “1”. The central column (marked
by 2 vertical lines) seems to be a logically deep sequence.
this, a string with great logical depth might require only
a very short program, while decoding the program takes
very long, much longer than the length of S. The prime
example of a pattern with great logical depth is presum-
ably life [35]. As far as we know, life emerged spon-
taneously, i.e. with a “program” assembled randomly
which had thus to be very short. But it has taken some
109 years to work with this program, on a huge parallel
analog computer called “earth”, until life has assumed
its present forms.
A problem in the last example is that “life” is not a
single pattern but rather an ensemble. Noise from outside
was obviously very important for its evolution, and it
is not at all clear whether we should include some of
this noise as “program” or not. The most reasonable
attitude seems to be that we regard everything as noise
which from our point of view does not seem meaningful,
and consider as program the rest. Take for instance the
environmental fluctuations which lead to the extinction
of the dinosaurs. For an outside observer, this was just a
large noise fluctuation. For us, however, it was a crucial
event without which we would not exist. Thus we must
consider it part of our “program”.
A more formal example with (presumably) large logi-
cal depth is the central vertical column in Fig. 8. This
figure was obtained with cellular automaton nr. 86, with
an initial configuration consisting of a single “1”. Since
both the initial configuration and the rule are very easy to
describe, the central column has zero Kolmogorov com-
plexity. From very long simulations it seems however that
it has maximal entropy [36]. Furthermore, it is believed
that there exists no other way of getting this column than
by direct simulation. Since it takes ∝ N2 operations to
iterate N time steps, we find indeed a large logical depth.
Formally, Bennett defines a string to be d-deep with
b bits of significance, if every program to compute it in
time ≤ d could be replaced by another program which is
shorter by b bits. Large values of d mean that the most
efficient program – from the point of view of program
length – takes very long to run. The value of b is a
significance very similar to the statistical significance in
parameter estimation: If b is small, then already a small
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change in the sequence or in the computer used could
change the depth drastically, while for large b it is more
robust.
A more compact single quantity defined by Bennett is
the reciprocal mean reciprocal depth
drmr(S) = PU (S)
 ∑
ProgU (S)
2−Len(ProgU (S))
t(S)
−1 , (24)
where PU (S) is the algorithmic probability of S defined
in Eq. (20), and t(S) is the running time of the program
ProgU (S). The somewhat cumbersome use of recipro-
cals is necessary since the alternative sum with 1/t(S)
replaced by t(S) would be dominated by the many slow
and large programs.
Logical depth shares with algorithmic information the
problem of machine-dependence for finite sequences, and
of not being effectively computable [35]. We never know
whether there isn’t a shorter program which encodes for
some situation, since this program might take arbitrarily
long to run. What we use here is the famous undecidabil-
ity of the halting problem. We can however – at least in
principle – exclude that any shorter problem needs less
time to run. Thus, we can get only upper bounds for the
algorithmic information, and lower bounds on the logical
depth.
E. Sophistication [37]
We have already seen in Sec. 2b (see Fig. 2) that de-
scription length increases sublinearly with system size (is
a convex function). This can also be seen in the following
way.
In practical computers there is a distinction between
program and data. While the program specifies only the
class of patterns, the data specify the actual object in the
class. A similar distinction exists in data transmission by
conventional (e.g., Huffman [38]) codes, where one has
to transmit independently the rules of the code and the
coding sequence.
It was an important observation by Turing that this
distinction between program and data is not fundamen-
tal. The mixing of both is e.g. seen in the Ziv-Lempel
code, where the coding sequence and the grammatical
rules used in compressing the sequence are not separated.
For a general discussion showing that the rule vs. data
separation is not needed in communication theory, see
ref. [20]. The convexity mentioned above is due to this
combination of “data” and “program”. If the “program”
and the algorithmic information are both finite, we ex-
pect indeed that the combined code length MN increases
asymptotically like MN = const+hN , where the additive
constant is the program length. This is shown schemati-
cally in Fig. 9. The offset of the asymptotically tangent
line on the y-axis is the proper program length.
It was shown by Koppel and Atlan [37] that this is
essentially correct. The length of the proper program,
FIG. 9. Total program length for a typical sequence with
finite algorithmic information per digit, and with finite proper
program length (“sophistication”; schematically).
called by them “sophistication”, can moreover be defined
such that it is indeed independent of the computer U used
in defining MN .
Sophistication is a measure of the importance of rules
in the sequence. It is a measure of the difficulty to state
those properties which are not specific to individual se-
quences but to the entire ensemble. Equivalently, it is a
measure of the importance of correlations. Rules imply
correlations, and correlations between successive parts of
the sequence S imply that the description of a previous
part of S can be re-used later, reducing thus the overall
program length. This aspect of complexity in an algo-
rithmic setting had been stressed before in ref.[21].
As we said already, the increase of average code length
with N has been studied for probabilistic models in [20],
with the result that the leading contributions are given
by Eq. (23). While this equation and its interpretation
fit perfectly into our present discussion, it shows also
a weakness which sophistication shares with most other
complexity measures proposed so far. It shows that un-
fortunately sophistication is infinite (diverging ∼ logN)
already in rather simple situations. More precisely, it
takes an infinite amount of work to describe any typical
real number. Thus, if the system depends on the pre-
cise value of a real parameter, most proposed complexity
measures must be infinite.
F. Effective Measure Complexity [32]
Let us now discuss a quantity similar in spirit to sophis-
tication, but formulated entirely within Shannon theory.
There, one does distinguish between rules and data, with
the idea that the rules are encoded and transmitted only
once, while data are encoded and transmitted again and
again. Thus the effort in encoding the rules is neglected.
The average length of the code for a sequence of length
n is the block entropy Hn defined in Eq. (11). We have
already pointed out that they are also convex like the
code lengths Mn in an algorithmic setting, and thus thus
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their differences
hn = Hn+1 −Hn (25)
are monotonically de-creasing to the entropy h. When
plotting Hn versus n (see Fig. 2), the quantity corre-
sponding now to the sophistication is called effective mea-
sure complexity (EMC) in [32] 5
EMC = lim
n→∞[Hn − n(Hn −Hn−1)]
=
∞∑
k=0
(hk − h) . (26)
The EMC has a number of interesting properties. First
of all, within all stochastic processes with the same block
entropies up to some given n, it is minimal for the Markov
process of order n− 1 compatible with these Hk. This is
in agreement with the the notion that a Markov ansatz
is the simplest choice under the constraint of fixed block
probabilities. In addition, it is finite for Markov processes
even if these depend on real parameters, in contrast to
sophistication. It has thus the tendency to give non-
trivial numbers where other measures fail.
Secondly, it can be written as a sum over the non-
negative decrements δhn = hn−l − hn as
EMC =
∞∑
n=1
nδhn. (27)
The decrement δhn is just the average amount of infor-
mation by which the uncertainty of sn+1 decreases when
learning s1, and when all symbols sk between are already
known. Thus EMC is the average usable part of the in-
formation about the past which has to be remembered
at any time if one wants to be able to reconstruct the
sequence S from its shortest encoding, which is just the
mutual information between the past and future of a bi-
infinite string. Consequently, it is a lower bound on the
average amount of information to be kept about the past,
if one wants to make an optimal forecasting. The latter is
obviously a measure of the difficulty of making a forecast.
Finally, in contrast to all previous complexity mea-
sures it is an effectively computable observable, to the
extent that the block probabilities pN (s1 . . . sN ) can be
measured.
The main drawback of the EMC in comparison to an
algorithmic quantity like sophistication is of course that
we can apply it only to sequences with stationary proba-
bility distribution. This includes many interesting cases,
but it excludes many others.
5 It was indeed first introduced by R. Shaw in The dripping faucet
as a model chaotic system, Aerial Press, Santa Cruz 1984, who
called it “excess entropy”. Claims made by Crutchfield et al.
[Phys. Rev. Lett. 63, 105 (1989); Physica D 75, 11 (1994);
CHAOS 13, 25 (2003)] that it was first introduced in J. P.
Crutchfield and N. Packard, Physica D 7, 201 (1983) are wrong.
FIG. 10. Deterministic graphs for the regular languages gen-
erated in 1 time step by CA rules nr. 76 (a) and 18 (b). The
heavy nodes are the start nodes (From ref. [39]).
G. Complexities of Grammars [33]
A set of sequences (or “strings”) over a finite “al-
phabet” is usually called a formal language, and the
set of rules defining this set is called a “grammar”. In
agreement with our general remark that complexities are
preferably to be associated to sets or ensembles, it is nat-
ural to define a complexity of a grammar as the difficulty
to state and/or apply its rules.
There exists a well-known hierarchy of formal lan-
guages, the Chomsky hierarchy [33]. Its main levels are in
increasing complexity and generality: regular languages,
context-free languages, context-sensitive languages, and
recursively enumerable sets. They are distinguished by
the generality of the rules allowed in forming the strings,
and by the difficulty involved in testing whether some
given string belongs to the language, i.e. is “grammati-
cally” correct.
Regular languages are by definition such that the cor-
rectness can be checked by means of a finite directed
graph. In this graph, each link is labeled by a symbol
from the alphabet, and each symbol appears at most
once on all links leaving any single node (such graphs are
called “deterministic”; any grammar with a finite non-
deterministic graph can be replaced by a deterministic
graph). Furthermore, the graph has a unique start node
and a set of stop nodes. Any grammatically correct string
is then represented by a unique walk on the graph start-
ing on the start node and stopping on one of the stop
nodes, while any wrong string is not. For open-ended
strings, we declare each node as a stop node, so that all
strings are accepted which correspond to allowed walks.
Scanning the string consists in following the walk on the
graph.
Examples of graphs for regular languages are given in
Fig. 10. They correspond to strings allowed in the sec-
ond generation of two cellular automata, if any string is
allowed as input in the first generation. Figure 10(a) cor-
responds e.g. to the set of all strings without blocks of
three consecutive “1”s, and with no further restriction.
One might define the complexity of the grammar as
the difficulty to write down the rules, i.e. essentially the
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FIG. 11. Part of a non-deterministic infinite graph accepting
all palindromes made up of 2 letters A and B. The front root
node is the start node, the rear is the stop node.
number of nodes plus the number of links. However,
in ref. [39] the regular language complexity (RLC) was
defined as
RLC = log n, (28)
where n is the number of nodes alone, of the smallest
graph giving the correct grammar (usually, the graph of
a grammar is not unique [33]). This makes indeed sense
as the so defined RLC is essentially the difficulty in per-
forming the scan: during a scan, one has to remember
the index of the present node, in order to look up the
next node(s) in a table, and then to fetch the index of
the next node. If no probabilities are given, the average
information needed to fetch a number between 1 and n
(and the average time to retrieve it) is log n.
Assume now that one is given not only a grammar
but also a stationary probability distribution, i.e. a
stationary ensemble. This will also induce probabilities
Pk(k = 1, ...n) for being at the k-th node of the graph
at any given time. Unless one has equidistribution, this
will help in the scan. Now, both the average information
about the present node and the time to fetch the next
one will be equal to the “set complexity” (SC),
SC = −
n∑
k=1
Pk logPk. (29)
It is obvious that the SC is never larger than the RLC,
and is finite for all regular languages. It is less ob-
vious that while the RLC is by definition infinite for
all other classes in the Chomsky hierarchy, the same
need not hold for the SC. All context-free and context-
sensitive languages can be represented by infinite non-
deterministic graphs [40]. And very often one finds deter-
ministic graphs with measures such that the Pk decrease
so fast with the distance from the start node that the SC
is finite [32].
We illustrate this for the set of palindromes. A palin-
drome is a string which reads forward and backward the
same, like the letters Adam said when he first met Eve:
“MADAM I’M ADAM” (by the way, the answer was also
a palindrome: “EVE”). A non-deterministic graph ac-
cepting all palindromes built of two letters A,B is shown
in Fig. 11. It has a tree-like structure, with the start and
stop nodes at the root, and with each pair of vertices
connected by two directed links: One pointing towards
the root, the other pointing away from it. The tree is in-
finite in order to allow infinitely long words (palindromes
form a non-regular context-free language; it is shown in
[40] that for all context-free languages one has similar
tree-like graphs). But if the palindromes are formed at
random, long ones will be exponentially suppressed, and
the sum in Eq. (29) will converge.
H. Forecasting Complexity [32,41]
Both the RLC and the SC can be considered as re-
lated to a restricted kind of forecasting. Instead of just
scanning for correctness, we could have as well forecasted
what symbol(s) is resp. are allowed to appear next. In
a purely algorithmic situation where no probabilities are
given, this is indeed the only kind of meaningful forecast-
ing.
But if one is given an ensemble, it is more natural
not only to forecast what symbols might appear next,
but also to forecast the probabilities with which they will
appear. We call forecasting complexity (FC) the average
amount of information about the past which has to be
stored at any moment, in order to be able to make an
optimal forecast.
Notice that while the Shannon entropy measures the
possibility of a good forecast, the FC measures the diffi-
culty involved in doing so. That these need not be cor-
related is easily seen by looking at left-right symbol se-
quences for quadratic maps (the symbol “C” appears for
nearly all start values x0 with zero probability, and can
thus be neglected in probabilistic arguments). For the
map x′ = 2 − x2, e.g., all R-L sequences are possible
[7] and all are equally probable. Thus, no non-trivial
forecasting is possible, but just for that reason the best
forecast is very easy: It is just a guess. In contrast, at
the Feigenbaum point [5] the entropy is zero and thus
perfect forecasting is possible, but as shown below, the
average amount of information about the past needed for
an optimal forecast is infinite.
Notice that the FC is just the average logical depth
per symbol, when the latter is applied to infinite strings
drawn from a stationary ensemble. Assume we want to
reconstruct such an infinite string from its shortest code.
Apart from an overhead which is negligible in the limit
of a long string, we are provided only an information of
h bits per symbol (h = entropy), and we are supposed
to get the rest of 1-h bits per symbol from the past (we
assume here a binary alphabet). But this involves exactly
the same difficulty as an optimal forecast.
In addition to be related to the logical depth, the FC
is also closely related to the EMC. As discussed in Sec.
14
3f, the EMC is a lower bound on the average amount of
information which has to be stored at any time, since it is
the time-weighted average of the amount of information
by which the uncertainty about a future symbol decreases
when getting to know an earlier one. Thus, we have
immediately [32]
EMC ≤ FC. (30)
Unfortunately, this seems to be a very weak inequality in
most cases where it was studied [32,41].
The difficulty of forecasting the Feigenbaum sequence
mentioned above comes from the fact that Eq. (26) for
the EMC is logarithmically divergent there.
The forecasting complexity is infinite in many seem-
ingly simple cases, e.g. for sequences depending on a real
parameter: For an optimal forecast, one has at each time
to manipulate an infinity of digits. In such cases, one has
to be less ambitious and allow small errors in the forecast.
One expects – and finds in some cases [41,42] – interest-
ing scaling laws as the errors tend towards zero. Unfor-
tunately, there are many ways to allow for errors [41,42],
and any treatment becomes somewhat unaesthetic.
I. Complexities of Higher-Dimensional Patterns
Up to now, we have only discussed 1-dimensional
strings of symbols. It is true that any definable object
can be described by a string, and hence in principle this
might seem enough. But there are no unique and canon-
ical ways to translate e.g. a two-dimensional picture into
a string. A scanning along horizontal lines as used in
TV pictures, e.g., leads to long range correlations in the
string which do not correspond to any long range corre-
lations in the picture. Thus, the complexity of the de-
scribing string is in general very different from what we
would like to be the complexity of the pattern.
One way out of this is to minimize over all possible
scanning paths when applying the above complexity mea-
sures (the entropy of a two-dimensional discrete pattern
can for instance be inferred correctly from a string ob-
tained via a Peano curve; moving along such a curve, one
minimizes the spurious long range correlations). In using
this strategy for complexity estimates, one should allow
multiple visits to sites in order to pick up information
only when it is needed [32]. Forecasting complexity, e.g.,
would then be defined as the infimum over the average
amount of information to be stored, if one scans some-
how through the pattern and forecasts at each site the
pixel on the basis of the already visited pixels.
I might add that by “forecasting” we mean the pre-
diction of the next symbol, provided one has already un-
derstood the grammar and the probability distribution.
The latter is in general not easy, and one might justly
consider the difficulty of understanding an ensemble of
sequences (or of any other systems) as the most funda-
mental task. We do not discuss it here further since it
does not easily lend itself to formal discussion.
J. Complexities of Hierarchy Trees
In a series of papers, Huberman and coworkers [22,43-
45] have discussed the complexity of rooted trees rep-
resenting hierarchies. As we have mentioned above, we
do not necessarily consider strictly hierarchical systems
as the most complex ones, yet many systems (including,
e.g., grammars for formal languages) can be represented
by trees and it is an interesting question how to measure
their complexity.
The starting point of Ref. [43] was very much the
same as ours: neither ordered nor completely random
trees should be considered complex. This left the authors
with the notion that the complexity of a tree is mea-
sured by its lack of self-similarity. This was strengthened
later by the observation that “ultra-diffusion” is fastest
for non-complex trees [44], and that percolation is easiest
for them [45]. In this, we have to compare trees with the
same “silhouette”, i.e. with the same average number of
branches per generation.
We can indeed interpret the results of refs.[44,45]
slightly different and more in the spirit of the above
approaches: instead of the lack of self-similarity, it is
the amount of correlations between ancestors and de-
scendants which slows down ultradiffusion and hinders
percolation. Thus, we see again that correlations are a
good measure of complexity.
A certain drawback of this approach is that the quan-
titative measures proposed in refs.[22,43] seem somewhat
arbitrary (they are not related to the difficulty of any ob-
vious task in a quantitative way), while no quantitative
measures are used at all in refs.[44,45] at all.
K. Thermodynamic Depth
In a recent paper [30], Lloyd and Pagels tried to de-
fine a physical measure of complexity very much in the
spirit of Bennett’s logical depth, but which should be an
effectively computable observable in contrast to logical
depth.
I must confess that I have some problems in under-
standing their approach. Like all the other authors men-
tioned above, they want an observable which is small
both for completely ordered and for completely random
systems. They claim that the right (indeed the unique!)
measure “must be proportional to the Shannon entropy
of the set of trajectories that experiment determines can
lead to the state” (ref.[30], p.190). Thus, a system is
called deeper if it has more prehistories than a shallow
one. By this criterium, a stone (which could be a pet-
rified plant) would be deeper than a plant which cannot
be a herbified stone!
This problem might be related to the fact that nowhere
in ref.[30] is stated how far back trajectories have to be
taken. In a chaotic system, this is however crucial. If we
agree that we always go back until we reach the “original”
blueprint, then the above problem could be solved: The
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first blueprint for a plant dates back to the origin of life,
while the stone might be its own blueprint. But neither
seems this to be understood in ref. [30] nor would it be
always clear what we consider the “blueprint”.
In table 1, we summarize the various proposed com-
plexity measures and the tasks they are related to. As a
rule, we can say that for each there exist a probabilistic
and an algorithmic version. While the algorithmic one
is always deeper and much more general, it is only the
probabilistic one which is computable and measurable,
and is thus more directly applicable.
IV. APPLICATIONS
To my knowledge, there have not yet been any real
applications of the above ideas to non-trivial and realistic
physical systems. The “applications” listed below have
to be viewed more as toy examples than anything else.
But I firmly hope that real applications that deserve this
name will come sooner or later.
A. Complexities for the Quadratic Map [32,46]
For the R-L symbol sequences generated by the
quadratic map, we have different behavior in chaotic,
periodic, intermittency, and Feigenbaum points. In the
chaotic domain, we have also to distinguish between
Misiurewicz (band-merging) points and typical chaotic
points.
While all complexities (EMC, RLC, SC, FC) are small
for periodic orbits, the EMC and the SC are infinite at
Feigenbaum points. The reason is that there the block
entropies Hn diverge logarithmically. Indeed, one can
show that for the Feigenbaum attractor the sequence
LL is forbidden, while the probabilities for the 3 other
length-2 blocks are the same: P (LR) = P (RL) =
P (RR) = 1/3. Thus, H2 = log 3. For blocks of
even length 2n, with n ≥ 2, one furthermore finds that
H2n = Hn + log 2. Together with the monotonicity of
hn, this gives finally hn ∼ const/n and Hn ∼ const log n.
Thus the symbol sequences on the Feigenbaum attrac-
tor are so restricted that any continuation is unique with
probability 1, but finding out the right continuation is
very difficult. From time to time we have to go very far
back in order to resolve an ambiguity 6.
For chaotic orbits, we have the problem (mentioned
already in the analog context of sophistication) that for
6 The same holds, by the way, also for quasiperiodic sequences and
for Penrose tilings of the plane. There, the entropy increases
logarithmically with the area. This is in my opinion the biggest
obstacle against accepting the observed quasicrystals as perfect
quasiperiodic lattices. While there would be no problem in a
strict equilibrium state, the times necessary to resolve the con-
straints of a perfect quasilattice are astronomic.
FIG. 12. Finite automata accepting the first approximations
to the symbol sequence grammar for the map x′ = 1.8 − x2.
Graphs (a) - (d) accept all sequences which have correct blocks
of lengths 1, ≤ 3, ≤ 4, and ≤ 6. The heavy node is the start.
sequences depending on real parameters the forecasting
complexity is infinite: when forecasting a very long se-
quence, it helps in using the control parameter a with
ever increasing precision, leading to a divergent amount
of work per symbol.
This does not apply to the EMC and to the SC.
Block entropies should converge exponentially [47], so
the EMC should be finite in general, as verified also nu-
merically [46]. Also, there exists a simple algorithm for
approximate grammars which accept all sequences con-
taining no forbidden words of length ≤ n with any n
[48,46]. The graphs accepting symbol sequences of the
map x′ = 1.8 − x2 correctly up to length 1, 3, 4, and 6
are e.g. shown in Fig. 12. Except at Misiurewicz points,
the size of these graphs diverges with n (so that the RLC
is infinite), but numerically the SC seems to stay finite.
Thus one needs only a finite effort per symbol to check
for grammatical correctness, for nearly all sequences with
respect to the natural measure [46].
Exactly at intermittency points, maps with a parabolic
critical point and with a quadratic tangency have the sta-
tionary distribution concentrated at the tangency point,
and have thus trivial symbolic dynamics. But the SC
can be shown to diverge logarithmically when an inter-
mittency point is approached from below, again due to
the divergence of the typical time scale.
A plot of the SC versus the parameter a is given in
Fig. 13. In order to locate better the various structures,
we show below it the bifurcation diagram.
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TABLE I. Complexity measures discussed in this paper and tasks they are related to
Task Complexity Measure
perform most efficient time c. (if CPU time is limiting factor)
algorithm space c. (if memory space is limiting)
store and retrieve the algorithmic (Kolmogorov-Chaitin) c.
shortest code
store and retrieve, but Ziv-Lempel type c.
coding is restricted
decode shortest code; logical depth (Bennett)
perform shortest algorithm
describe set of symbol strings sophistication (Koppel-Atlan)
verify that symbol string regular language complexity
belongs to some regular language
verify as above, but assuming set complexity
stationarity and using a
known probability measure
forecast a symbol string forecasting c.
chosen randomly out of (probabilistic version of logical depth)
stationary ensemble;
encode its shortest description
percolate through tree, c. of trees
diffuse between its leaves
? thermodynamic depth
understand system ?
B. Complexities of Grammars for Cellular
Automata [39, 32]
Wolfram [39] has studied the grammars of spatial
strings si, i ∈ Z, generated by 1-dimensional CA’s after
a finite number of iterations (the input string is taken
as random). He finds that after any finite number of it-
erations the languages are always regular (this holds no
longer if one goes to CA’s in 2 dimensions, or to the
strings after infinitely many iterations [49]).
One finds that for some rules the RLC increases very
fast with the number of iterations. In many cases this
corresponds to an actually observed intuitive complexity
of the generated patterns, but for some rules (like, e.g.,
rules 32 or 160) the generated patterns seem rather triv-
ial. In these latter cases, there is indeed a large difference
between the RLC and the SC, the latter being very small
[32]. Thus, the invariant measure is very unevenly dis-
tributed over the accepting deterministic graphs. Most
of their parts are hardly ever used there during a scan of
a typical sequence.
C. Forecasting Complexities for Cellular Automata
The only class of sequences for which we were able
to compute finite forecasting complexities exactly were
sequences generated by CA’s after a single iteration step.
Cellular automata with just one iteration are of course
ridiculously simple systems, and one might expect very
trivial results. But this is not at all so.
Assume there is a random stream of input bits, and at
each time step one output bit is formed out of the last
3 input bits. The question one is asked is to predict as
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FIG. 13. Set complexity obtained with the natural invariant
measure for the logistic map x′ = a − x2 versus the control
parameter a (upper part). In the lower part, the bifurcation
diagram is shown (from [46]).
good as possible the probabilities pi(0) and pi(1) for the
i-th output bit to be 0 or 1, based only on the knowledge
of previous output bits (in physics language, the input
sequence is a “hidden variable”).
It is possible to give the optimal strategy for such
an forecast [41]. It involves constructing a determinis-
tic graph similar to those needed for regular languages.
But now to each link is attached, in addition to the label
s, a forecast p(s). The FC is then given by the Shannon
formula Eq. (29), with the grammar-recognizing graph
replaced by the graph producing the optimal forecast.
While it is true that the FC is finite for all elementary
CA’s, the graphs are infinite for many rules [41].
Let me illustrate the method for rule 22. In this cellular
automaton, the rule for updating the spins is that 001,
010, and 100 give “1” in the next generation, while the
other 5 neighborhoods give “0”. We write this as
s = F (t, t′, t′′) (31)
with F (0, 0, 0) = 0, F (0, 0, 1) = 1, etc.
Assume that we have a random input string of zeroes
and ones, called tn, n = 0, 1, 2, . . .. Let us denote by
Pn(t, t
′|Sn−1) the probability prob(tn−1 = t, tn = t′),
conditioned on the first n− 1 output spins to be Sn−1 =
s1, s2, . . . sn−1. When forecasting the first output bit s1,
the only information we can use is that the probabilities
P1(t, t
′) are equal to 1/4 for each of the 4 combination
of t and t′. Let us denote by pn(s|Sn−1) the forecasted
probability for expecting the n-th output spin sn to be s,
again conditioned on Sn−1. One easily convinces oneself
FIG. 14. Part of the graph needed to forecast a sequence
generated by CA rule 22 after 1 iteration [41]. The heavy node
is the start node. To each link are associated fixed forecasting
probabilities p(s = 1) and p(s = 0) = 1 − p(s = 1), where s
is the next output symbol. In some of the nodes, we have
indicated the value of p(s = 1).
that
pn(s|Sn−1) = 1/2
∑
t,t′,t′′
Pn(t, t
′|Sn−1)δ[s− F (t, t′, t′′)].
(32)
For n = 1, this gives p1(0|.) = 5/8, p1(1|.) = 3/8. After
having predicted the next output by means of Eq. (32),
we are told its actual value sn and have to update the
probabilities for the input row. One finds
Pn+1(t
′, t′′|Sn) = [2pn(sn|Sn−1)]−1
∑
t
Pn(t, t
′|Sn−1)×
× δ[sn − F (t, t′, t′′)]. (33)
In this way, we alternate between the updating (33) of
the input probability, and the actual forecast (32).
Each different value of the array {Pn(t, t′′|Sn−1) :
(t, t′) = (00) . . . (11)} corresponds to a node of the fore-
casting graph. Different nodes imply in general different
forecasts in the next step7, while the same forecasts are
obtained each time the same node is passed.
Part of the graph for rule 22 obtained in this way is
given in fig.14. For more details, see ref.[41].
7 This is actually only true after minimizing the graph as described
for the purely algorithmic case in ref.[33].
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FIG. 15. Pattern generated by CA nr. 22 from a random
start. Time runs again downwards, space horizontally.
FIG. 16. Entropies hn for spatial sequences in bits (dots) and
for time entropies in natural units (crosses) in the stationary
state of CA 22, versus block length.
D. Effective Measure Complexity for Cellular
Automaton # 22
The most interesting application in view of possible
self-generation of complexity is to the CA nr. 22. In this
cellular automaton, the rule for spin updating is that
001, 010, and 100 give“1”, while the other 5 neighbor-
hoods give “0”. When starting from a single “1”, one
gets a Pascal’s triangle, and when starting from a ran-
dom configuration one finds a pattern (Fig. 15) which at
first sight does not look very interesting.
A closer inspection shows, however, that the block en-
tropies for horizontal and for vertical blocks in the sta-
tionary state (reached after several thousand iterations)
do not seem to increase linearly with the block length.
Otherwise said, the differences hN seem to decrease like
powers of N (fig.16), such that both temporal and spa-
tial strings have zero entropy in the stationary state.
This is very surprising as the block entropies do diverge.
Hence these strings are neither periodic nor fractal nor
quasiperiodic nor random. Indeed, to my knowledge they
are not like anything which other authors have encoun-
tered anywhere else.
The interesting aspect of this result is that it is very
similar to an important aspect of life. Life is self-
organizing in the sense that it leads to very special forms,
i.e. from a wide basin of attraction it leads to a much
narrower set of meaningful states. But this alone would
not yet be surprising. The surprising aspect is that this
attraction is not at all rigid. Although the “attractor” is
very small compared to full phase space, it is still huge
and it therefore allows for a wide spectrum of behavior.
It is exactly this which is shared by rule 22. Having zero
entropy, the attractor is extremely constrained, but hav-
ing divergent block entropies it is still vast.
E. Entropy and Effective Measure Complexity of
Written English
I have looked at a number of other sequences whether
they show similar long-range correlations, leading to a
similarly small entropy. One does not seem to encounter
this in symbol sequences generated by dynamical systems
with few degrees of freedom. One does however encounter
it to some degree in natural languages. In written En-
glish, e.g., the entropies hN decrease from 4.4 bits per
character for N = 1 to less than 1 bit for large N [14].
A direct application of the defining equations (11) -
(13) to natural languages is unpractical due to the very
long range of correlations. Alternative methods were de-
vised already by Shannon [13]. In these, mutilated text
was given to native speakers who could be assumed to
be familiar with the grammar and probability measure
of the text, but not with the text itself. The redundancy
(and thus also the entropy) of the text was estimated
from the percentage of letters which could be crossed out
without impairing the understanding, and by the ability
to complete letters of unfinished phrases.
Objective entropy estimates were based in ref.[14] on
the average length of sequences which repeat at least
twice in a text of total length N . This length is given
asymptotically by Eq. (21). Within N = 2 × 105 let-
ters, the average length of repetitions was ≈ 8 letters.
Since the average word length in English is ≈ 5.5 letters,
one is then already sensitive to grammatical constraints
between words. The decrease of the resulting entropy es-
timate (after taking into account leading corrections to
Eq. (21)) is shown in fig.17. We see a rather slow de-
crease – indicating a large EMC as expected – to a very
small entropy value. We cannot indeed exclude that also
there h = 0, with a power law convergence towards this
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FIG. 17. Entropy estimates for written English based on the
average lengths of repeated letter sequences (from ref.[14]).
On the horizontal axis is shown the total text length.
limit8.
An attempt to analyze in a similar way DNA se-
quences failed due to extremely high repetition rates and
non-stationarities. While the assumption that written
English forms an ensemble with well-defined statistical
properties seems reasonable, this is not so for DNA.
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